Is there any link between trade openness and growth? The present study seeks to answer this question. As an introduction to our study we start with a discussion of the process of evolution from the Ricardian policy prescription of free trade to 'Washington Consensus' (WC) along with almost parallel development of the idea of economic nationalism and their link with colonization and catching-up debate (Section 1). Then we survey some of the existing theoretical and empirical works in this field (Section 2). Subsequently we present our empirical findings based on both panel data and time-series analysis (Sections 3 and 4). The summary and concluding observations are presented in the last section (Section 5).
Ricardian Free Trade Doctrine and Neo-liberal 'Washington Consensus' vis-à-vis Economic Nationalism
The old Ricardian dictum of international division of labour according to comparative advantages provided the academic support to the nineteenth century pattern of free trade between colonies/semi-colonies and their ruling countries. The classical writers believed that the operation of the two laws of return -the law of diminishing returns in primary production and the law of increasing returns in manufactures -in a free and competitive market-economy world would lead to an improvement in the terms of trade of the primary-producing countries. In the process of the free play of international market forces these countries would enjoy the fruits of industrial revolution through favourable terms of trade. Thus the colonial pattern of trade (free flow of food and raw materials from the colonies in exchange of finished manufactures from their ruling countries) in a world of colonisation and conquest (the nineteenth century pattern of globalisation) got its legitimacy from the-then 'mainstream' economics.
Almost parallel to the free trade ideology (an extension of the natural order and laissez faire philosophy) the idea of economic nationalism and infant-industry argument for trade restrictions came up not only in the writings of scholars such as Friedrich List but also in the policies pursued by the countries that were the late-starters in industrial revolution. Their policy makers were clever enough to understand that the free trade ideology preached by the British economists and statesmen was actually a part of the strategy of ' kicking away the ladder' with which Britain reached the top (for details see Chang, 2002) .
Guided by economic nationalism the late-starters of industrial revolution developed rapidly and were able to catch up with the pioneers. Analysing the industrial development of Germany and England, Veblen (1915) pointed out the 'advantages of relative backwardness '. Gerschenkron (1952) updated and extended the work of Veblen to include Russia, France and Italy. In the process developed the 'catching-up'/convergence hypothesis: the latecomers in industrialization tend to grow faster because learning and imitation is typically cheaper and faster than is the original discovery and testing (see also Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Gomulka, 1987) .
The poor colonies could not catch up as they could not follow the policy of economic nationalism (independent of their ruling countries' national interests). In fact the countries such as India faced de-industrialisation (decline of their artisan activities which were much advanced than their European counterpart) in the early stages of industrial revolution (see Sarkar, 1992 for details and reference). Thus the world became divided into the industrially developed North ('Centre') constituting the countries, which could catch up the pioneers (for evidence of catching up see Abramovitz, 1986 ; see also Sarkar, 2000) and the industrially backward primary-goods producing South (raw-material supplying 'Periphery') constituting the countries which could not catch up.
The orthodox 'mainstream' economic theory chose to ignore this history (perhaps their proponents all over the whole industrialised world were guided by the same 'kicking away the ladder' strategy) and continued to show the virtue of free trade in an articulated way of characterising a make-believe world (and mesmerised a large number of students of economics all over the globe).
However, outside the orbit of orthodox 'mainstream' economics exists a large number of sensible heterodox scholars who choose not to ignore history, and institutions in suggesting a policy prescription to a less developed region. John R Commons is one such scholar, a big name in institutional economics (see Lafayette, 1965 for an evaluation of his contribution). He provided The Theory of Reasonable Value (Commons, 1934) and advocated protectionism from a practical institutional aspect (see Ramstad, 1987 for details of this theory).
In the post-Second World War Period, Prebisch (1950 Prebisch ( , 1959 Prebisch ( , 1964 and Singer (1950) from the platform of United Nations and UNCTAD raised their voice against the conventional wisdom of free trade and suggested to the newly independent colonies and semi-colonies to follow the path of import-substituting industrialisation, ISI (see also Myrdal, 1956 for the same policy prescription) and tried to show that the terms of trade followed the path opposite to what was postulated by the classical writers. The PrebischSinger hypothesis generated much controversy (for details see Sarkar, 1986 and 2001) .
But through their direct and indirect influence or guided by economic nationalism (independent of the Prebisch-Singer-Myrdal thesis of autarkic development) the national governments of the newly independent colonies and semi-colonies and many Latin American countries followed the ISI.
In the process of rapid domestic industrialisation under the ISI strategy these countries required increased imports of machines and technology and pulled most new resources to import-competing activities. It resulted into more rapid growth in the demand for foreign exchange that surpassed the growth in export earnings. In the process these countries began to face acute balance of payments problems. This situation demanded increased export drive to pay for imports.
Moreover, to finance the balance of payments deficit, these countries became dependent on the rich industrially developed countries and international financial institutions such as the IMF/World Bank, dominated by the rich developed countries. The distressed Southern countries seeking their help are often advised to open up their economy to foreign trade and investment along with many other kinds of structural adjustments (such as removal of state controls, reduction of state expenditures, public sector disinvestments to make room for private investment etc). All these 'neo-liberal' policy prescriptions were summed up as the 'Washington Consensus' (WC) by John Williamson (an economist from the Institute for International Economics, an international economic think-tank based in Washington, D.C.).
An almost universal policy response was that these countries left (by choice or per force) the course involving inward-looking ISI and started following outward-oriented development strategy. In the process, importance of foreign trade in the level of economic activities of these countries has been rising (for a discussion of the ordeal faced by the Latin American countries under the neo-liberal strategy, see Adkisson, 1998 and .
The increased openness was hailed in IMF/World Bank circles. Different World Development Reports (World Bank, 1987 , 1991 tried to show that outwardoriented trade policies have been more successful in promoting growth than inwardoriented trade policies. Particularly, World Development Report (1987) argued that "outward oriented countries" performed better than "inward oriented countries" even under unfavourable market conditions. The success stories of East Asian countries ('East Asian Miracle') were often shown as the success of free trade and export-oriented policies.
Some scholars, however, questioned the validity of the World Development Reports (see for example, Singer, 1987; Singer and Gray, 1988) . Many scholars questioned the success stories of East Asian countries as vindication of the neo-liberal paradigm of the WC (see for example Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Chang, 1993 and Önis, 1995) and at least on one occasion World Bank (1993) conceded. Nevertheless the transitional economies (ex-socialist countries) are advised to follow the WC-type policy prescriptions. True to the tradition of institutional economics, many scholars (Adams, 1987 , Adkisson 1998 , Atkinson, 1998 , Went 2000 , Marangos 2001 and Bitzanis and Marangos, 2007 are expressing their concern against the neo-liberal paradigm embedded in the WC-type policy prescriptions for the less developed countries as well as for the transitional economies as the 'one-size-fit-for-all' policy ignores history, institutions and economic structures of these countries. Scholars such as Adkisson (1998) observe 'reperipherization' -bringing back the old centre-periphery division of the world, once resented by the Latin American 'structuralists' such as Raul Prebisch.
In this perspective we discuss the existing theoretical and empirical evidence in the next section and present our findings in the subsequent sections.
Existing Literature: Some Selected Works
Some of the 'new' endogenous growth theories suggest that trade policy affects long-run growth through its impact on technological change. In the models of this tradition (see for example Grossman and Helpman, 1992) openness to trade provides access to imported inputs embodying new technology, increases the size of the market faced by the domestic producers raising the returns to innovation, and facilitates a country's specialisation in research-intensive production (Harrison, 1996, pp.419-420) .
The endogenous growth literature, however, has been 'diverse enough to provide a different array of models in which trade restrictions can decrease or increase the worldwide rate of growth', as Yanikkaya (2003) rightly points out and refers to the works of Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1990) , Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a.b) and Matsuyama (1992) . Increased competition could discourage innovation by lowering expected profits. Grossman and Helpman (1992) point out that intervention in trade could facilitate long-run growth if protection encourages investment in research-intensive sectors. The works of Lucas (1988) , Grossman and Helpman (1991 a, b) , Young (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993) show that even if the trading partners have considerably different technologies and endowments, economic integration may adversely affect individual countries even if it raises the worldwide growth rate (Yanikkaya 2003, p.59 ). Ocampo and Taylor (1998) point out that 'the preferred defence of trade liberalisation' as found in Krueger (1997) and others, 'invokes a general equilibrium model with constant or decreasing returns to scale' and the theory of static comparative advantages; against that they remind the old infant industry argument which formed the basis of state intervention in many countries in the past. They further mention the works of Young (1928) and Kaldor (1978) which 'emphasised how increasing returns and cross firm externalities can lead to cumulative growth processes and different patterns of specialisation across economies' and criticized the neoclassical argument of trade intervention based on 'convexity' assumption.
In view of the ambiguities in the theoretical literature, a number of empirical studies were undertaken to examine the relationship between trade liberalisation and growth. Due to the difficulty of measuring openness, different studies have used different measures to examine the effects of trade openness on economic growth. Anderson and Neary (1992) have developed a 'trade restrictiveness index' which tries to incorporate the effects of both tariffs and non-tariffs barriers; it is available for a small sample of countries. So many cross-country studies used trade shares in GDP and found a positive and strong relationship with growth (as reviewed in Harrison, 1996) . A number of studies have looked at the relationship between average tariff rates and growth. Lee (1993) , Harrison (1996) and Edwards (1998) found a negative relationship between the tariff rates and growth. The studies of Edwards (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Clemens and Williamson (2001) concluded that the relationship is weak. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) tried to replicate the result of Edwards (1998) and found that average tariff rates had a positive and significant relationship with total factor productivity (TFP) growth for a sample of 43 countries over the period 1980-1990. Studies of Harrison (1996) , Edwards (1998) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) used black market premium (BMP) as a measure of the severity of trade restrictions and reported a significant and negative relationship between the BMP and growth. However, Levine and Renelt (1992) and Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) pointed out that the BMP is highly correlated with a number of 'bad' policies and outcomes such as high inflation, severe external debt problems, ineffective law enforcements etc and so using BMP for a measure of trade restrictions gives a misleading picture.
Some authors constructed different indices of trade orientation such as openness index by Leamer (1988) , price distortion and variability index by Dollar (1992) and openness index of Sach and Warner (1995) and argued that outward-oriented countries outperformed inward-oriented countries. These measures of trade barriers are often correlated with other sources of poor economic performance, as Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) rightly pointed out.
In a recent study Yanikkaya (2003) used a large number of openness measures for a cross-section of countries over the last three decades. His analysis found a significant positive correlation between trade shares and growth. However, this study observed that different measures of trade barriers are positively associated with growth in the less developed countries.
In this perspective of confusion and contradiction, our study presented in the next two sections seeks to examine the relationship between trade openness and economic growth not only at the cross-country level but also at the levels of different regions and countries over time since the 1960s. We have considered three alternative models between the rate of growth of real GDP per capita (PCGDPG) and trade openness index (TRDGDP): between-effects model (BE), the country-fixed effect model (FE) and the random-effect model (RE).
Relationship between
The BE model is equivalent to taking the average (mean) of each variable for each country across time and running a regression on the data set of averages (for a sample of 51 countries 51 observations of TRDGDP and PCGDPG). This averaging procedure results in loss of information (one observation per country rather than 22 observations per country over the period ). Nevertheless we have estimated this BE model and observed that across the countries, the higher the TRDGDP, the higher is the growth rate (both averaged over the period, 1981-2002) . But if we use dummies for different groups as defined above -rich and poor or closed and open, we get no significant impact of these factors (Table 2) .
Keeping in mind this result we consider two other models: FE and BE. The FE is designed to control for omitted variables that differ across countries but are constant over time. This is equivalent to generating dummy variables for each country-cases and including them in a standard linear regression to control for these fixed country-effects.
The RE is used if there is a reason to believe that some omitted variables may be constant . It has no effect implying that there is no sign of convergence (the higher the initial per capita GDP, the lower is the growth rate of per capita GDP) of the standard of living across the countries (this is true for the both BE and RE models). The utility of cross-section studies lies in the fact that the lack of enough observations per country can be overcome by increasing the number of countries in the study -even one single observation of a country can be utilised. But it is often doubtful how far it gives a causal relationship among the variables under study. Moreover a cross-section panel regression analysis often tries to include as many countries as possible -some studies cover (say) 60 countries, some covers 80 countries and all the countries covered in the study are implicitly given the same weight (it is also difficult to devise a weighting system). It is difficult to justify how far one can treat a country such as Papua New Guinea or Ghana at par with a country such as Brazil or India. There always remains a scope for proving or disproving anything through a suitable choice of sample.
It is also doubtful how far a general result based on a cross-section study can be used to provide a policy prescription for a particular country. In this respect time-series analysis gives better insight since it deals with individual country cases. When enough data are available for a single country it is better to carry forward a case study. But The study of long-run relationships between two time-series variables require a test of unit root -the test for the integration of the series -how many times the series are to be differenced to attain the stationarity property needed to carry forward a meaningful (as against spurious) regression analysis (the residuals of the regression are to be stationary to apply the standard t-tests of significance). Once Nelson and Plosser (1982) argued that all the macroeconomic variables have unit root -they are long-memory series. In simple language this observation implies that a temporary shock has a permanent effect (an econometric counterpart of the so-called real business cycle models of the 'modern' macroeconomics). The standard regression analysis is usually based on the assumption that the series are short-memory series -a temporary shock creates a transitory deviation from the path of the series. So instead of using the standard regression analysis one has to use cointegration approach. Subsequently the observation of Nelson and Plosser (1982) was questioned but it became a standard practice to conduct unit root tests before conducting any analysis of relationship between two variables. But the problem is that different tests of unit root often give different results and the lower the length of the series the lower is the power of the standard tests. The Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) does not require such pre-testing and 'data-mining'. This technique can be used to test for the existence of a long run relationship between two variables irrespective of whether they are stationary or not (having unit root or not). We shall use Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran and Shin (1999) to ascertain the existence of a long run equilibrium relationship between trade openness and growth. This approach does not require any pre-testing of the variables to determine the order of their integration (how many times the data are to be differenced to achieve the stationarity property of the data).
In the ARDL approach the following equation is fitted:
where Y t is the growth rate of real GDP per capita (PCGDPG) in period t, X t is the trade openness index -share of total trade in GDP (TRDGDP) in period t and p, q are unknown lags to be determined by various criteria. 
Concluding Observations
The the works producing the contrary evidence are often summarily rejected without proper refereeing (these editors often calculate the probability of success of a paper depending on its conclusion presented in the abstract and rejects anti-WC paper without wasting time and money for refereeing). Thus a 'mainstream' academic consensus is being built in favor of WC. This paper questions this 'mainstream' consensus and supports the heterodox position.
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